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ABSTRACT 
This  paper examines the role that work incentives play in 
the determination of work hours.  Following previous research by 
Lang  (1989),  we use a conventional efficiency wage model to 
analyze how firms respond to worker preferences regarding 
wage-hours packages.  We find that when workers are homogeneous, 
the role of worker preferences in determining work hours is 
similar to the simple neoclassical model of labor supply.  For 
instance, if worker preferences shift in favor of shorter hours, 
firms will respond by of  fering jobs entailing shorter hours. 
When workers have heterogeneous preferences, however, 
employers will want to use a worker's hours preferences as a 
signal for the responsiveness of the worker to the work 
incentives used by the firm, and workers in turn may not reveal 
their hours preferences.  Our key finding in this instance is 
that the labor market equilibrium may be characterized by a 
sub-optimal number of short-hour jobs.  This shortage of 
short-hour jobs is likely to be found in high wage labor markets. 
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Female labor force participation has increased  dramatically over the past three dec- 
ades.  Much of this  change  is  due to the increased  participation of married women and 
women with children.1 In households where both adults participate in the labor force, or 
where there is a single  working parent, individuals  will often have greater demands on 
their time at home and may therefore desire patterns of work hours that differ from other 
workers.  Given the gender based division of labor in most American households, many 
of the  women entering the labor force may prefer  shorter (and perhaps more flexible) 
work weeks.2 Furthermore, as sex roles  adjust to  accommodate  the changing work and 
career aspirations of women,  it is reasonable  to expect that increasing numbers of men 
will also prefer shorter work weeks.  The prospects  for equality of economic  opportunity 
between  men and  women rest in large measure  on how well and  how rapidly labor markets 
accommodate  the hours preferences  of workers who desire this flexibility. 
In this paper we ask whether labor markets  will provide the optimal number of  short- 
hour jobs in response to an increase in demand for short hours on the part of employees. 
According to the simple textbook model of the determinants of work hours, the answer to 
this question is clearly yes. Firms have an incentive to elicit information about their hours 
preferences because this allows them to offer labor contracts that minimize  cost. Similarly, workers have sn incentive to reveal their preferences  to firms because this information is 
used to construct wage end hours packages in which  workers are asked to work the utility 
maximizing number of hours at the market-clearing  wage. 
In this paper we suggest that labor market outcomes may be considerably  more com- 
plex in a setting where firms rely  on work incentives to regulate the effort exerted  by 
employees.3 We find that in a simple efficiency wage model  (along the lines of Shapiro and 
Stiglitz J1984J and Bowles [1985J, but with a  heterogeneous  work force) workers'  hours pref- 
erences  may provide an indicator of their responsiveness  to the work incentives. In this 
setting employers  will in general not be able to elicit accurate information about hours 
preferences  from employees.  We show that this market fallure may lead in turn to labor 
market equilibria  which are characterized by an underprovision  of  short-hour jobs. We find 
further that the shortage of  short-hour jobs most likely uccurs in high wage  labor markets. 
Our model  suggests that the simple textbook analysis of hours determination relies 
upon the wrong market metaphor.  The conventional  approach presumes that the deter- 
mination of work hours is similar to the determination of car colors.  Workers have an 
incentive to reveal their true hours preferences  and employers have an incentive to solicit 
these  preferences for the same reason that consumers  have an incentive to reveal their color 
preferences and car makers have an incentive to solicit these preferences. 
In our view,  a more appropriate market metaphor for hours determination is the 
market for health insurance. Employees  have an incentive to portray themselves  as  desiring 
long hours for the same reasons that purchasers of health insurance will want to portray 
themselves  as having no health problems. Insurance providers must be concerned about 
the unobservable  characteristics of  individuals who are attracted to the various insurance 
contracts they offer.  We suggest that employers face similar concerns when offering wage 
and hours packages. 
The paper  proceeds as follows;  In the next section (section  2), we analyze the determi- 
nation of wages and work hours when firms  use dismissal threats to motivate a homogeneous 
2 group of workers.  Section 3 examines the case where workers  have heterogeneous  prefer- 
ences with respect to hours of  work. In Section 4, we consider whether our argument about 
a shortage of short-hour jobs can be reconciled  with the rapid growth of part-time  work 
observed in the United States since the 1950's. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2.  Wages and Hours with Homogeneous  Workers 
2.1. A  Simple Model of Work IncenUve3 
In this section, we develop a model in which firms uses dismissai threats to regulate 
the intensity with which their employees  work.  Models  based on dismissal threats are 
analytically convenient and match nicely with the employment-at-will  legal doctrine that 
governs labor law in the United States.  However, the logic of our argument would not 
be  appreciably altered if incentives revolved around promotion probabilities rather than 
separation probabilities. 
The setup is quite simple. The economy is composed  of a large number of firms each 
making use of the same concave  production technology, such that the demand for labor is 
an inverse function of unit labor cost. 
In  each period there is a  flow of  identical workers  into the labor market. These workers 
form queues at the firms, which in turn select workers  from their own queue.  Worker who 
are hired remain with the firm until they retire or  are dismissed for working  at low  intensity. 
We assume that workers who are not hired when they first join the labor force will drop 
out of the market, and we similarly assume that workers who retire or are dismissed do 
not seek re-employment  with other firms.4 
Workers in any period derive utility from  income,  the level of work effort,  and leisure. 
Workers can adopt two levels of intensity, "high"  or "low".  A worker providing the lower 
level of effort is said to be  "shirking."  Let  U(y,N) be the utility in any period of a 
worker  who is shirking at a job paying  income  p with N hours of work.  Similarly,  let 
U"(y,N) be the utility of a worker who is not shirking.  Incentive problems arise because 
3 UQ,,N) > U11(y,N). 
Firms will attempt to get employees  to work at the high level of work intensity by 
dismissing  those workers found to be providing  the low level of intensity. These shirking 
workers are detected and dismissed in any period with probability J1 Under the assump- 
tion that employers lesrn about employee  behavior by observing them on the job, D is a 
function of N, with D(O) = 0 and D' > 0. 
For convenience, we abstract from issues relating to pensions and rising wage-tenure 
profiles by stipulating that workers  are infinitely lived and that wages  in each period are 
the  same.6 We also assume that the probability a worker retires, q, is the same each period. 
Under these conditions,  the discounted present value of  employment  for a worker producing 
at the high level of  work intensity is 
=  +  +  (1) 
where r is the discount rate and V" is the discounted  present value of  leaving the current 
job (i.e., Vt is the present value of the flow of utility when both p and N are 0). 
In  contrast to non-shirkers,  shirking  workers can be  dismissed  when they are  discovered 
working at the  low level of work intensity. The expected  discounted present value of lifetime 
utility for a shirking  worker is 
=  + (1 
— q)(l—D)V' + [1 —(1 —cRi— D)]V"  (2) 
A rational worker will not shirk when V" ￿ V'. Let Ut be the utility derived from a 
single period of  full time leisure. Using  equations (1) and (2) we notice that workers  will 
not shirk as long as,7 
— Ut ￿ r, 
where 
—  (U  — Ut)(r+q)  (3)  - 
(I-q)D 
4 The term r  is the minimum value of the difference between current utility of  employment 
and unemployment  that is required to assure no-shirking. Since this "employment  rent" is 
always  positive,  the utility of employment at the high level of  work intensity exceeds the 
utility of not working for the marginal worker.  Assuming that the no-shirking condition 
represents a binding constraint in the market, there will be workers  who cannot find 
employment.8 
2.2. Determining  H0ur3 of Work 
In the absence  of fixed employment costs, cost minimizing  firms will set hours, N, so 
as to minimize the wage that assures no-shirking.  Consider the case where utility from 
working N hours at wage w for a shirking and non-shirking  worker is given, respectively, 
by the following simple quasi-linear  form: 
U' = wN — e(N) + pg(N), 
and 
U" = wN — e(N) +  ug(N),  (4) 
where wN is the utility of  income, g(N) is the utility derived  from leisure (g' < 0, g" < 0), 
,u is a positive parameter, and e(N) is the disutility of work effort.  For both shirking and 
non-shirking  workers, e(0) = 0, e'(N) > 0 and e"(N) ￿  0, and since working at the higher 
level of effort is distasteful, c(N) > e,(N).  With this utility function, the no-shirking 
condition becomes 
wN — c(N) + g(N) 
— jg(0) ￿  r,  (5) 
with 
r= (r+q)E  — 
(1-.-q)D' 
and 
E = e(N) 
— e,(N). 
5 By examining the derivative of equation (5) we find  that firms will be paying the 
minimum  wage consistent with no-shirking  when they set hours  such that 
(6) 
where 
(r + q)E' I  D'/D  rN= 
(1—q)D 
The terms on the left-hand side of equation (6) represent the utility of income generated 
from an additional hour of work (w) adjusted for the disutility of work effort (—4), and 
the utility lost from giving up an hour leisure (jig'). For any given wage, the worker will he 
maximizing  utility when he or she works the number of hours for which the sum of these 
terms is zero. 
The wage and hours package  offered by firms  will entail the utility  maximizing  number 
of hours only when the employment rent is invariant with respect  to hours, i.e., when 
= o. While it is in principle possible that rN will be zero, it also possible for rN > o. 
When this happens, the employment rent increases  with work hours and firms offer a 
wage and hours package such that the effort-adjusted marginal utility of income exceeds 
the marginal loss of utility from giving up leisure. Employees  accepting this wage-hours 
package  will therefore perceive themselves to be hours constrained.'0 
For our purposes, the central question is how labor markets will respond when worker 
preferences  shift in favor of shorter working  hours.  Let (ova, Ns) be the cost minimizing 
wage and hours package.  Differentiating the no-shirking condition (5) and first order 
condition  for cost minimization (6), and assuming  that the second order condition holds 
for the minimization problem, it is easy to demonstrate that 
dwsg(O)—g(Ne)0  (7) 
dp  N5  ' 
and 
dN5  cPu'  ' 
,  don0  —=  g—-1-  <0.  (8) 
6 The result given by expression (8) is not surprising.  As  increases so does employees' 
marginal utility of leisure relative to income.  Since firms prevent shirking by offering  a 
wage-hours  package that is attractive  to workers, firms will want to respond to this shift 
in preferences  by offering jobs entailing shorter hours.  The result that dwo/d,a  is positive 
(equation  (7)) also has a strong intuitive appeal.  The effectiveness  of dismissal threats 
rests on denying shirking workers access to high future income streams. Since an increase 
in  corresponds to an increase in the value workers place on leisure relative to income,  a 
higher income stream (and therefore a higher wage) is required to assure no-shirking." 
Our findings suggest that when the work force is homogeneous,  firms using efficiency 
wage incentive schemes  will respond to a change in employee preferences favoring shorter 
hours by offering  wage-hours packages  entailing both shorter hours and higher wages. 
Nonetheless,  jobs may be characterized by hours constraints, and individual workers may 
not perceive themselves  to be working optimal hours. 
3.  Wages and Hours with  Heterogeneous  Workers 
3.1.  Work Hours as a Signal 
We turn  next to the analysis of incentive  schemes  firms use when employees  have 
heterogeneous  preferences.  We focus our attention on the wage-hours  packages firms of- 
fer when individual workers have different  values of t, i.e.,  differing marginal rates of 
substitution between leisure and income. 
In the preceding section, we notice that workers desiring short hours (i.e., workers with 
high  values of ji) will require a higher wage to assure no shirking. If worker preferences 
are known  to firms,  firms will  clearly  choose not to hire the more expensive short-hour 
workers.  If worker  preferences are not apparent to firms,  however,  this simple outcome 
may not be possible.  Employees, fearing the consequences  of the signal they are sending 
by asking to work a given number of hours, will not reveal their true hours  preferences  to 
their employers.'2 
7 In sections 3.2 and 3.3 below we explore the implications  this market failure has for 
the ability of markets to respond to the preferences  of workers desiring short hours.  To 
highlight the role played  by the unobservable  (to the firm) worker heterogeneity, we assume 
in what follows that the probability of dismissal, D, and the single period utility gain from 
shirking, E, are hnear functione  of N such that D = dN and £ = eN.  As noted in 
footnote 9, rN = 0 in this case, and thus no hours restrictions would emerge if workers 
were homogeneous. 
£2.  Fooling  and Separating Contracts 
We consider  a labor  force with two types of  workers, type S and type L.  These workers 
are identical in all respects except that p  > PL. Note that  type S workers will, at any 
wage,  prefer shorter hours than type L workers;  we refer to type S and L workers  as, 
respectively,  short- and long-hour workers.  Let B represent the proportion of short-hour 
workers in the population. 
We suppose that  firms independently name contracts that  they always proceed to 
honor. These contracts specify wages and hours available to employees,  and always stipu- 
late that workers  who provide the low level of  effort will be dismissed if detected.  As we 
proceed, we  will assume, for simplicity,  that shirking  workers produce zero output. 
The  presence of two types of workers leads firms to offer one of two types of  employ- 
ment contracts, "pooling contracts" or "separating  contracts." Under a  pooling contract, a 
firm offers a single  wage-hours package to all workers.  In principle, this contract could be a 
"long-hour"  or "short-hour" pooling  contract — formed to meet the no-shirking conditions 
of  either long- or short-hour  workers.  In the long-hour pooling contract, a firm would offer 
to all employees the minimum cost wage-hours package necessary to elicit the high level 
of work effort from long-hour  workers.  In the short-hour pooling contract, a finn would 
offer employees the minimum cost wage-hours  package necessary  to elicit the high level of 
work effort from short-hour workers. However, short-hour pooling contracts  will always 
be at least as expensive  as the separating contracts we discuss in the following paragraph. In analyzing pooling employment contracts we therefore need only concern  ourselves with 
long-hour pooling contracts. 
Under long-hour  pooling contracts (henceforth,  simply "pooling cootracts"), long-hour 
S 
workers provide high levels of work effort,  while short-hour workers shirk.  For a firm that 
wants to prevent shirking among both types of workers, the cost minimizing strategy is to 
specify a contract allowing  workers  to select either a long-  or short-hour option. We refer to 
such contracts as "separating contracts." Under a separating contract, the firm's objective 
is to offer the minimum cost wage-hours  packages subject to the constraints imposed by 
the no-shirking conditions. 
A  final  type of contract that could arise  might be termed a "screening  contract." 
Under  this contract a firm would  offer a wage and hours package with very long hours, 
so that short-hour workers would  find the positions less attractive than the alternative 
of unemployment.  These workers  would  thus  be  effectively screened out  of the labor 
force.  For a screening contract to be effective,  the wage and hours package must not 
only be sufficiently unattractive to short-hour  workers, but must also meet the no shirking 
condition for long hour workers. Screening  contracts  will not always be feasible, and where 
they are feasible  they may be more expensive than the pooling or separating contracts. 
In the present analysis we  will assume  that  screening  contracts are not  a viable option 
to firms.  Thus firms will restrict attention to two types of contract — pooling  contracts 
and separating contracts. We procede by describing first the pooling contracts, then the 
separating contracts. 
Pooling  Contracts: With a pooling contract,an  employer  offers  all workers the wage- 
honrs package designed to prevent long-hour  workers from shirking. Short-hour workers 
hired under this contract shirk, and the resulting dismissals  increase the exit rate of  short- 
hour workers.  Thus, the proportion of short-hour  workers in the population, 9, exceeds  the 
proportion of short-hour workers who are employed  in firms offering  a pooling contract, 
ep. 
9 It is straight forward to demonstrate that in a steady state the following  relationship 
holds: 
P  q+(1—O1—q)D  (9) 
It is clear that  Op  0, with the equality holding only when 0 equals zero or one.  For 
future reference it is also worth noting that Op is a  monotonically  increasing function of 0. 
Due to shirking, the average productivity of the short-hour workers is less than the 
long-hour workers.  Here we are assuming shirkers produce zero output.  Thus, in  an 
equilibrium in which all  firms offer  pooling contracts, the per unit labor  cost will  be 
ws/(1 
— Op), where We  is the minimum wage consistent with no-shirking on the part of 
long-hour  workers.  Using  (9) we can express unit costs in this case, C", as a function of 
the proportion of short-hour workers in the population, 0: 
C"(O) = w 
[i 
— 
q + (1—  (1— q)D] 
•  (10) 
Notice that unit labor cost in the pooling equilibrium  is an increasing function of 0. 
Separating Contracts: Firms  may alternatively  offer a separating contract in response 
to worker  heterogeneity. The problem for the firm is to construct wage-hours packages, 
(Ws, Ns) and (wL, NL), such that the package taken by any worker  will meet that worker's 
no-shirking condition. Suppose that for a firm offering this separating contract, 0s is the 
proportion of the short-hour workers.  Then the formal cost minimization problem is, 
OSWSNS + (1 — OS)WLNL 
mm  ,  (11) 
OsTVs + (1 
— OS)NL 
subject to binding no-shirking condition for the type S worker,'3 
WSNS — eN5 + psg(Ns) ￿  17 + ,isg(O),  (12) 
a 
and the constraint that type L workers prefer the (WL,NL) package, 
WLNL  — eNL + /4Lg(NL) ￿  wsNs 
—  eNs + ,zg(Ns).  (13) 
10 For a concrete example, suppose  that the utility for  leisure is a simple quadratic term, 
g(N) = —N'.  For  ease  of notation we let 4J =  1 and note that us must then exceed 
unity. After several  algebraic steps, we find that a firm's minimum unit labor cost when 
offering a separating contract is 





] •  (14)  9s + (1 
—  — 1) 
The hours offered to short- and long-hours  workers respectively  are 
N  — 





Figure 1  illustrates such a separating contract.  In this figure, NSC5 and NSCL 
represent the no shriking conditions for short- and long-hour  workers, respectively. Firms 
offer a wage-hours  package, (ws,  Ns), that attracts short-hour workers, and meets their 
no shirking constraint. Also offered is a package, (wL, NL), with hours and wages that are 
as attractive to long-hour  workers as the short-hour Package.'4 
An important feature of the separating contract is that the labor cost for a firm 
adopting the separating equilibrium, C'(Gs), depends crucially on the mix of the two 
types of workers.  As the proportion of type S workers  (Os) approaches 0, the labor cost 
approaches 
C(0)=e+2T4,  (16) 
which, it can be shown, is simply the minimum  no-shirking  wage for the long-hour  workers, 
wo. Unit labor cost is strictly increasing  in 9s, and as 9s approaches 1, labor cost converges 
to the minimum  wage that solves the no-shirking  constraint for short-hour workers, 




































 3.3.  The Provision of 5hor Hour Jobs 
Our central concern in this paper is analyzing the response of labor markets to an 
influx  of workers  desiring short hours.  Beginning with a labor market  composed  entirely 
of long-hour workers, we explore  how the wage-hours  packages offered by firms change as 
we increase the number of short-hour workers.  Our focus will be on steady states. 
As outlined above, all firms must choose between naming pooling contracts in which 
some  fraction of  employees will shirk, or separating contracts in which all workers are given 
wage-hours  packages  that induce no-shirking. In deciding which strategy to pursue, firms 
will compare the costs of  pooling and separating contracts. The cost of each contract for 
any firm depends in turn on the composition  of  workers in that firm's job queue. 
Recall that we have  assumed that workers who enter the labor force form queues at 
each firm, and when hiring, a firm selects at random  workers from its own queue. A worker 
cannot at any time be in more than one queue.  We assume that workers choose which 
queue to join based on the contracts named by the prospective employers. More precisely, 
under our assumption that individuals maximize expected utility, a worker's decision  to 
join a job queue is based upon the expected utility of the job and the probability of  being 
hired into the job out of the queue.  This latter probability is determined by the number 
of vacancies  to be filled and the number of workers in the queue. 
With this in mind, suppose a firm is considering  a switch  from offering the pooling 
labor contract to a separating labor contract. As we have seen, the cost of labor in the 
separating contract will hinge on the mix of workers  the firm attracts, 9s  In turn, the 
proportion of short-hour workers  in any firm depends on the actions of other arms in the 
market. In a market in which  all firms are offering only long-hour  jobs, a firm that deviates 
from the market by offering a mix of short- and long-hours  jobs will generally attract a 
disproportionate number of  workers who prefer short-hour work. Indeed, such a firm may 
well attract only short-hour workers. 
The process we describe can  easily lead to a sub-optimal market equilibrium.  In 
12 particular, an equilibrium can persist in which  individually optimizing firms offer pooling 
contracts, even though  switch by all firms to separating contracts would (i) reduce unit 
labor cost and thus lead to higher labor utilization, and (ii) increase wages and utility of 
employment for all workers. 
To establish this result, we examine first the decision  of a firm considering  the shift 
from a pooling contract to a separating contract.  The firm will pursue this option only 
if the shift reduces unit labor cost, i.e., if C'(9s) < CP(6).  Suppose that a firm offering 
a separating contract attracts exclusively  short-hour workers.15 In this case, the firm will 
prefer the separating contract if 
C(l) cc C(9).  (18) 
Using  (10) and (17), expression (18) can be rewritten to show that the firm will offer the 
separating contract only when 9 is such that 
+ 2(psr)'12 <(e + 2F"2) 
[1 
— 
q + (1 —(1  — q)D] 
(19) 
The right-hand side of (19), the unit cost of  offering a pooling contract, is increasing 
in 9, and approaches infinity as 9 tends toward one.  Thus, when the workers who prefer 
short hours constitute a large enough group in the labor force, the firm nill always find 
it profitable to offer short-hour positions.  On the other hand, if the fraction of type S 
workers  in the population is small enough (i.e., 6 close to 0), inequality (19) cannot hold. 
In this case, no firm will be inclined to deviate  from the norm of offering only long-hour 
positions. 
Notice, however, that if all firms in the market were to switch from offering pooling to 
separating contracts, each would attract the pepulattoss proportion of short-hour workers 
to its queue.  Such a switch would reduce labor cost if 9 were such that 
C'(9) c C(9),  (20) 
or, using (10) and (14), 
e +2H {9+:(;  1;]  c(e+2F"2) [1_ q+ (1 -9)(l -  q)D] 
.  (21) 
13 The term in brackets on the left-hand side of (21) is always  less than ps. Thus by 
comparing inequalities (19) and (21), we observe  a key feature of our model — that there 
is a range for the value  of 9 for which unit labor cost declines when all firms switch  to 
separating contracts, but for which any individually  maximizing firm nonetheless continues 
to offer the pooling contracts. That is, there are values of 9 for wbich 
C'(9) c C(9) < C'(l).  (22) 
Figure 2 illustrates this  point. When 9 exceeds 9', labor cost will be lower in the separating 
equilibrium  than in the pooling equilibrium. Equation  (18) suggests,  however, that no firm 
will have  the incentive to offer a separating contract unless  9 exceed 9". Thus we have 
the result that for any mix of worker such that (22) holds, unit labor cost will decline 
and output  will increase if firms collectively adopt separating contracts.  Nonetheless, no 
one firm finds it advantageous to abandon its practice of offering pooling contracts.  As 
compared with the pooling equilibrium,  the separating  equilibrium  is characterized by  lower 
labor cost, even  though the wages  received by both types of workers  are higher.  In the 
separating equilibrium, the quantity of  labor utilized and market output are higher. Both 
short-hour and long-hour workers gain higher utility from employment in the separating 
equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium. 
It is tempting to suggest that the coordination problem highlighted above might be 
circumvented  if, by collective agreement, all firms  were to agree to offer separating employ- 
ment contracts.  However, each firm will have an incentive to defect from this agreement 
by offering a pooling contract.  The defecting  firm would in this way attract a dispropor- 
tionately large number of  relatively inexpensive long-hour  workers. If other firms were to 
follow suit, the separating equilibrium  would unravel and the market would once again be 
characterized  by a sub-optimal pooling equilibrium. 
An important implication of  our model  is that extra-market intervention can improve 
















































































































































 equilibrium by mandating that (i)  all employees must he offered the option of working 
at short or long hours, and (ii)  dismissals  must be for just cause,  If the  dismissal  of 
short-hour workers  in high proportion were taken as  evidence of  violation of the law, firms 
would be induced to offer short-hour jobs by providing  separating contracts.  As we have 
demonstrated, it is possible that  such a law will result in lower labor cost to firms and 
higher wages to workers. While it may seem paradoxical that by restricting the actions of 
parties to an exchange one could improve the welfare  of the parties, this conclusion  has 
been reached in a number of  other models where information is imperfect.'6 
4.  Labor Market Segmentation  and Part-Time Work 
Prior to 1950, part-time work was virtually non-existent  in the United States economy. 
During the 1950's employers began offering jobs having less than 35 hours per week as a 
means of attracting older, married women into the labor force (Goldin [1990], p.  180-183). 
Over the past  twenty years, the percentage of women  working  part-time has remained 
roughly constant at about  25 percent (Blank [1990]). Considering  the rapid growth of the 
female labor force, this  figure suggests a significant rate of growth  of part-time employment. 
Can the rapid growth of  part-time work be reconciled with our claim that work incen- 
tives  inhibit the introduction of short-hour jobs?  To answer  this question we enrich our 
model  slightly by introducing two different labor markets—primary  and secondary.  The 
primary labor market is composed of firms making use of the dismissal based incentive 
schemes described in the preceding sections.  Firms in the secondary labor market produce 
different goods than those in the primary labor market.  Most importantly for our pur- 
poses,  the technology  used in secondary labor markets makes it easy to observe the work 
activities of  employees.  It follows then that secondary labor markets pay a market clearing 
wage.  Workers who are not fortunate  enough to get selected out of the queue for primary 
jobs, and workers who are dismissed  from primary jobs can always secure employment  in 
4 
the lower paying secondary sector.  Notice that in equilibrium there will typically be an 
15 excess supply of workers to the primary market.17 
In the secondary labor market, firms do not use dismissal based work incentives and 
wili therefore allow employees  to choose the hours of work that maximize utility.  This 
stands in contrast to the primary labor market where  firms offer the minimum cost wage 
and hours package that satisfies the no-shirking  condition. On the basis of  our model,  we 
would expect that most part-time jobs are found in the secondary sector. The  examination 
of separating contracts presented in the preceding section suggests that where part-time 
jobs do exist  in the primary sector, part-time employees may receive a higher wage than 
full-timers. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that part-time jobs are generally found in the sec- 
ondary labor market, Rebitzer and Taylor (1991) find that industries with high concen- 
trations of part-time workers tend to be low wage industries. In a study of labor market 
segmentation  amoug non-union men, Rebitzer and Robinson (forthcoming) find that 4.9 
percent of the men in the primary sector work part-time.  In contrast,  31 percent of the 
men in the secondary sector are part-timers. 
Blank (1990)  offers an extensive analysis of wage differences  between part-time and 
fuil-time workers.  The data she presents indicate that more than 70 percent of part-time 
workers are found in the generally  low wage sales, clerical and service occupations and only 
22 percent are found in the relatively high wage professional,  managerial and technical  oc- 
cupations (Blank [1990], p. 129).  After controlling for selection effects, Blank reports that 
within occupations the effect of part-time work on wages is generally positive although 
not  always statistically significant.  However,  she emphasizes that part-time  workers in 
"professional  and managerial positions show particularly large and positive wage differen- 
tials, holding all other variables constant" (p. 143).' These results are consistent with our 
expectation that within the primary sector, employees having short-hour jobs may receive 
higher wages  than other employees. 
16 5.  Conclusion 
Firms look for workers  whose attitudes and preferences  make them responsive to the 
work incentives prevalent in the firm.  These incentives often involve promises to provide 
(and threats not to provide) income in the future.  Thus preferences  towards income  and 
leisure will be important to firms in deciding whom  to hire. 
This paper has presented a model of wage and hours determination in which firms 
use dismissal  threats to elicit high levels of  work effort.  In our model workers who prefer 
long hours will be more responsive to dismissal  based incentive schemes  than other workers. 
Employers  will therefore whenever  possible put job seekers with preferences  for  short hours 
at the bottom of the queue of workers seeking jobs. 
In order to avoid unemployment  or employment  in low wage positions,  job seekers will 
not reveal their trite preferences  for income and leisure. We demonstrate that the response 
by employers may result in the provision of fewer short-hour jobs than is optimal. In the 
context of a model of  labor market segmentation, the shortage  of  short-hour jobs  will occur 
in the high wage, primary sector. 
The logic of  the model we present suggests that labor markets will not adjust smoothly 
to the changes  brought about by the rise in female labor  force participation. In the absence 
of some intervention in the market, firms will find it difficult  to provide the optimum 
number of  short-hour jobs in response to the increasing  numbers of  female and  male workers 
seeking to balance job and family responsibilities. 
17 End Notes 
1.  In 1950 the labor force participation rate of married women was 29.5 percent compared 
to 51.1 percent in 1980 (Goldin [1990], p.  17).  The 1950 figure  includes  women over age 
14, while the 1980 figure includes only women over  15 years old. In 1970 the labor force 
participation rate of women with children under 18 was 42.1 percent. By 1985 this figure 
was 62.1 percent (Bergmann  [1986], p. 2). 
2.  Fuchs  (1986) estimates that in 1979 women spent 1,497 hours per year on non-market 
work compared to 595 hours for men. Non-market work includes  activities like shopping, 
yard work and child care. Leete-Guy and Schor  (1990) estimate that on average women in 
1979 spent 1514 hours per year on non-market  work.  This figure declined to 1442 in 1987. 
The comparable  figures for men were 860 and  853 respectively  (Leete-Guy  and Schor, 1990, 
Table 2). 
3.  A number of previous studies have concluded  that work incentives may influence the 
determination hours of work.  Lang (1989) and La.zear (1981) argue that work incentives 
may cause employers to offer wage-hours  packages under which employees do not perceive 
themselves to be working optimal hours. Bulow and Summers  (1986) argue that reliance 
upon work incentives may cause employers to seek to avoid hiring employees having pref- 
erences for abort hours.  Bulow  and Summers' consideration of heterogeneous workers 
focuses primarily on the case where different  hours preferences  (and turnover propensities) 
are known to the employer because they vary by an observable  characteristic, gender. For 
a discussion  of the effects of  worker heterogeneity  on unemployment  and wages, see Weiss 
(1990). 
4.  In an earlier version of this paper, we set up our model using an alternative assumption 
that workers who quit or are fired may subsequently  re-enter the labor force.  This alter- 
native set-up leads to similar results as those presented here, but the derivations are much 
more cumbersome. 
5. We assume that firms always correctly identify shirkers.  It is straight forward, however, 
to introduce erroneous dismissals  into the model.  For a discussion  of the implications that 
erroneous dismissals  have on labor market outcomes see Levine (1989). 
6.  For a discussion  of these issues in a closely related model see Larear (1981) and Akerlof 
and Katz (1990). 
7.  To highlight the central point of  the model, we do not allow  workers to post performance 
bonds.  (Dickens, Katz, Lang and Summers [1989] provide a discussion of this issue.) 
Further, we stipulate that workers in each period are paid prior to the observation of their 
work activities in the period. Thus the discipline effect of  dismissal is derived entirely from 
lost future earnings. 
8.  The finding that labor market equilibria may be characterized by unemployment is 
common to many effort regulation models. See Bowles (1985) and Stiglitz (1987). 
18 9.  For example, rN will be equal to zero when both E and D  are linear functions of N. 
In this case D'/D = E'/E = 1/N, since D(0)  E(0) = 0.  rN may also be zero if E' = 0. 
10.  This is the case analyzed in Lang (1989).  Lang ensures that FN > 0 by assuming D 
to be concave and e to be zero. In theory, it is also possible for FN to be negative.  In 
this situation workers  will be required to work more than the optimal number of hours. 
Empirically,  however,  one finds that the incidence of "excess  hours" is small compared 
to the number of workers reporting they worked optimal hours or were hours constrained 
(see Kahn and Lang 11987, 1988a, 1988b], Altonji  and Pa.xson  [1986, 1988], Best  [1978, 
Dickens and Lundberg [1985], and Shank [1986]). 
11.  Bulow and Summers  (1986) express this point vividly by noting, "Firms  prefer to give 
jobs  to workers who 'really need them' than to workers who gain less surplus from holding 
them" (p.  400). 
12.  In order to eliminate short-hour workers  from their job queues, firms may discriminate 
in hiring against groups  known to have, on average, a preference  for shorter hours.  Such 
discrimination  may be important in many labor markets.  In this paper we abstract from 
statistical discrimination  because it not essential to our argument. 
13.  Note that because the no-shirking wage  is lower for long-hour than for short-hour 
workers at any N, only the no-shirking condition for short-hour workers will be binding in 
this problem. 
14.  As shown in Figure 1, hours constraints can arise due to the nature of the separating 
contract. For instance, short-hour workers  are asked to work fewer hours than they would 
choose given their wage, ws. This occurs because firms do not find it optimal to provide 
short-hour jobs lying at the minimum point of  these workers'  no-shirking  curve, NSCs. In 
comparison  with this minimum  point, a move  by the firm to the left along  the no-shirking 
curve has only a small adverse effect on the wage, ws. This effect is more than offset by 
the reduction in cost associated with the decline in the use of the relatively expensive  type 
S workers and the drop in the wage  that must be paid type L workers. 
15.  All we need to establish the results that follow is that there be .oms adverse selection 
at work, i.e., that the proportion of type S workers the firm attracts  be greater than the 
population 8.  The presentation of the case where 8s = 1 simplifies the exposition. 
16.  See, for example,  Levine (1990) and Aghion  and Hermalin (1990). 
17.  This dual labor market model is essentially the same  as that presented in  Bulow 
and Summers (1986). The theory of dual labor markets has generated a large body of 
qualitative and quantitative research. For surveys see Rebitzer (1989) and Dickens and 
Lang (1988). 
18.  Blank also found that part-time workers  were in all occupations less likely to receive 
health insurance and pension benefits.  However, Blank's data  does not allow us to estimate 
the discounted present value  of these benefits and we therefore cannot compare the total 
19 hourly compensation of  part-time and full-time employees. 
20 References 
Akerlof,  George A., and Katz, Lawrence F., "Workers'  Trust Funds and the Logic of 
Wage Profiles,"  Quarterly Journal of  Economics,  August 1989, 525—536. 
Aghion, Philippe, and Hermalin, Benjamin, "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts 
Can Enhance Eciency," Journal of  Law, Economics  and Organization, Fail 1990, 
6:2, 381—410. 
Altonji, Joeseph G., and Paxson, Christina H., "Labor Supply Preferences, Hours Con- 
straints,  and Hours-Wage Trade-offs,"  Journal of  Labor Economics,  April 1988,  6:2, 
229—253. 
Altonji, Joseph G., and Paxson, Christina H., "Job Characteristics and Hours of  Work," 
Research in Labor Economics  (ed, Ronald G. Ehrenberg), JAI Press 1986, Part A, 
1—55. 
Bergmarm,  Barbara, The Economic  Emergence  of Women (New York: Basic Books, 
1986). 
Best, Fred, "Preferences  on Worklife Scheduling  and Work-Leisure  Tradeoffs," Monthly 
Labor Review, June 1978, 31—37. 
Blank, Rebecca, "Are Part-Time Jobs Bad Jobs?" in A Future of  Lousy Jobs? Gary 
Burtless, ed., (Washington,  D.C.:  Brookings Institution, 1990). 
Bowles, Samuel, "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Wairasian, Neo- 
Hobbesian, and Marxian Models,"  American  Economic Review,  March 1985, 75:1, 
16—36. 
Bulow, Jeremy I., and Summers, Lawrence  H., "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with 
Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination,  and Keynesian Unemployment," 
Journal of  Labor Economics,  July 1986, 4:3, Part 1, 376—414. 
Dickens, William T., Lawrence Katz, Kevin Lang, and Lawrence Summers, "Employee 
Crime and the Monitoring  Puzzle," Journal of  Labor Economics, July 1989, 7:3, 
331—347. 
Dickens, William, and Lang, Kevin, "Neo-Classical  and Sociological Perspectives on Seg- 
mented Labor Markets," in Industries, Finns and Jobs: Sociological and Economic 
Approaches, George Farkas and Paula England, eds. (New York: Plenum Press, 
1988). 
21 Dickens, William T., and Lundberg, Shelly J., "Hours Restrictions and Labor Supply," 
NBER Working  Paper No. 1638, June 1985. 
Fuchs, Victor, "His and Hers: Gender Differences in Work and Income, 1969-1979,"  Jour- 
nal of  Labor Economics, July 1986, 4:3, pt. 2, S245—S272. 
Goldin, Claudia, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of  American 
Women  (New York: Oxford University Press,  1990). 
Kahn, Shulamit, and Lang, Kevin, "The Effects of  Hours Constraints on Labor Supply 
Estimates," NBER Working Paper No. 2647, July 1988. 
Kahn, Shulamit, and Lang, Kevin, "Constraints on the Cboice of  Work Hours: Agency 
vs. Specific Capital," mimeo, 1987. 
Kahn, Shulamit, and Lang, Kevin, "The Causes of Hours Constraints: Evidence from 
Canada," mimeo, October, 1988. 
Lang, Kevin, "Why Was There  Mandatory Retirement?"  Journal of  Public Economics, 
1989, 127—36. 
Lazear,  Edward P., "Agency,  Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," 
American Economic  Review,  September 1981, 71:4, 606—20. 
Leet-Cuy, Laura, and Schor, Juliet, "Assessing the Time Squeeze Hypotbesis:, Estimates 
of  Market and Non-Market Hours in the United States, 1969-1987," mimeo, Harvard 
Department of Economics,  1990. 
Levine, David I., "Just-Cause Employment  Policies  When Unemployment  is a Worker 
Discipline  Device,"  American Economic  Review, September  1989, 79:4,  902—905. 
Levine, David I., "Just-Cuase Employment  Policies in the Presence of  Worker Adverse 
Selection," mimeo, University of California,  1990. 
Rebitzer, James, "Efficiency Wages and Implicit Contracts: An Institutional Evalua- 
tion," in Microeconomic  Issues in Labor Economics, Robert Drago and Richard 
Perlman, eds. (Sussex,  U.K.: Wheatsheaf Books, 1989). 
Rebitzer, James, and Robinson,  Michael, "Plant Size and Dual Labor Markets," Review 
of  Economics and Statistics, forthcoming. 
Rebitzer, James, and Taylor, Lowell,  "Work kicentives  and the Demand for Primary and 
Contingent Labor," NBER working paper 3647, 1991. 
22 Shank, Susan E., "Preferred Hours of  Work and Corresponding  Earnings," Monthly La- 
bor Review, November  1986, 109:11, 40—44. 
Shapiro, Carl, and Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Equilibrium  Unemployment  as a Worker Disci- 
pline Device,"  American  Economic Review, June 1984, 74:3, 433—44. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., "The Causes  and Consequences of the Dependence  of Quality on 
Price," Journal of  Economic  Literature, March 1987, 25:1,  1-48. 
Weiss, Andrew, Eciency Wages: Models of  Unemployment,  Layoffs, and Wage Disper- 
sion (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,  1990). 
23 